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CAUSATION, ECONOMISTS, AND THE
DINOSAUR: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR DRAY
JEROME M. CULP*
Now in the case of all other scourges sent from Heaven some explanation of a cause
might be given by daring men, such as the many theories propounded by those who
are clever in these matters; for they love to conjure up causes which are absolutely
incomprehensible to man, and to fabricate outlandish theories of natural philosophy,
knowing well that they are saying nothing sound, but considering it sufficient for them,
if they completely deceive by their argument some of those whom they meet and
persuade them to their view.
INTRODUCTION
Dinosaurs become extinct, individuals are injured by drunken drivers, and
Mexico fails to avoid war with the United States-all of these are situations
that are produced by some elemental causal forces. In general, the similarity
of the causal questions at issue in these cases is ignored. Scientists tend to
view their scientific causal inquiry in the dinosaur example as fundamentally
different from the causal inquiry in the legal setting. This comment suggests
that it is not possible for a scientist to ask, "What caused the dinosaur to
become extinct?" or a judge to ask, "What caused an individual to be injured
by a drunk driver in an automobile accident?" or a historian to ask, "What
caused Mexico to fail to avoid war with the United States?" without raising
and addressing a series of very similar questions. Ultimately, in all of these
cases the investigator must ask what caused the event. This comment begins a
discussion of these common causal questions in the context of the legal
discussion of causation.
Generations of legal scholars, judges and legislators have unsuccessfully
struggled with the idea of causation. Hart and Honor6 in their book Causation
in the Law2 have been among the most influential interpreters of the use and
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abuse of causation in determining responsibility in legal disputes. Professor
Dray has noted the contradictions and confusion in the description of
causation by Hart and Honor6. 3 Much of this confusion stems from Hart and
Honor6's use of the notions of attributive and explanatory causation and the
use of cause and mere condition to explain the idea of responsibility.
Professor Dray argues that Hart and Honor6 fail to define a workable
dichotomy between explanatory and attributive causes.
Part of Professor Dray's difficulty with Hart and Honor6's concepts is the
elusiveness of their definitions. This elusiveness is traceable to the failure of
Hart and Honor6 clearly to define the goals of the causal inquiry and the
entity that is to determine causation. Once the causal goal and the causal
decision maker are defined, most of Professor Dray's concerns collapse into
other, or at least more familiar, complexities. Defining the causal goal and the
causal decision maker has the additional advantage of highlighting and
contrasting Hart and Honor&s concerns about the assignment of
responsibility.
The traditional notion of cause as described by Hart and Honor6 becomes
most significant when it is contrasted with the discussions of causation found
in the extensive literature of the proponents of law and economics. The
acceptance of the economists' perspective on causation has contributed
significantly to the confusion of the courts and commentators about
causation. 4 The economists' contribution to causation is to increase the
number and kind of issues that causal decision makers-courts, legislatures,
and administrative agencies-use in allocating liability in legal situations.
Essentially, economists argue that causal decision makers ought to use factors
that impact economic efficiency when they allocate liability. 5 In the
economists' world, the traditional notions of causation do not exist. By
examining the views of the proponents of law and economics, this comment
will demonstrate the usefulness of Hart and Honor6's distinctions between
causes and conditions, and between attributive and explanatory causes.
The economists who have written about causation have adopted a view
Hart and Honor6 call causal minimalism. 6 The only concern of causal
minimalists is the way in which something contributes to the instrumental
Honor6's book, H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). Hart and Honor6's basic
arguments about explanatory and attributive causes, and the distinction between causes and
conditions are essentially unaltered from the original edition.
3. Dray, Causal judgment in Attributive and Explanatory Contexts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1986, at 13.
4. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974). In Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank,
673 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1982) Judge Posner attempts to apply the economic perspective to causal
issues using the Learned Hand formula. For an explanation of the Hand formula, see infra note 26
and accompanying text. See generally Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979);
Kaye & Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1984); Landes & Posner,
Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Rizzo & Arnold, Causal
Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Shavell, An
Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980).
5. See H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR9, supra note 2, at lxvii-lxxvii; see also infra section III.
6. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORf, supra note 2, at lxviii.
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goal of achieving economic efficiency or social welfare maximization. Within
this perspective, causal goals and causal decision makers are clearly defined.
Causal decision makers are simply those individuals or institutions who have
the duty of determining causation, assigning responsibility, and allocating
liability in order to achieve the chosen instrumental goal. For economists,
that goal is economic efficiency. With respect to historical or biological
questions, the historian or the biologist is the causal decision maker. They are
the individuals who investigate the data and determine what events are
causally related to other historical or biological events. With respect to legal
questions, the causal decision maker is the judge, jury, administrative agency,
or legislature assigned the task of finding individuals liable for their actions.
Some situations involve more than one causal decision maker. For example,
in the case of a worker injured in an industrial accident, the administrator of
the workers' compensation act, the court (in resolving any surviving common
law questions), and the legislature (in enacting legislation making some
employers criminally liable) are all causal decision makers.
Defining causal goals is slightly more difficult than defining causal decision
makers. Causal goals are those goals that decision makers use in determining
causation, assigning responsibility, and allocating liability. For example, the
cliometrician attempts to explain historical trends through the use of
economic and social statistics, and the intellectual paradigms of cliometrics.
The intellectual historian's goal is to explain how earlier ideas have influenced
later thought. Among judges, legislators, and administrators, the causal goal
varies. They sometimes attempt to maximize wealth or social welfare and
other times attempt to achieve corrective justice. For example, when a
drunken driver injures an innocent third party, judges who emphasize social
welfare maximization would focus on different issues than those that
emphasize individual responsibility. By altering their goals, causal decision
makers will significantly influence the outcome of their causal determinations.
The definition of causal goals is partially tautological in that some of the
complexity and confusion of defining causation is incorporated in the goals
chosen. For example, the cliometrician is not seeking simply to find any set of
facts that explain a historical event, but those facts that can be seen as causing
the succeeding historical events. The causal minimalist, on the other hand,
defines causation in terms of the instrumental goals of economic efficiency or
social welfare maximization.
Section II of this comment briefly discusses the factors that allegedly
contributed to the extinction of dinosaurs. It then shows that the application
of Hart and Honor6's analysis to the dinosaur question yields reasonable and
interpretable results. Section III demonstrates that, by applying the causal
views of several proponents of economic theory to the dinosaur hypothetical,
the proponents of law and economics are in different ways causally myopic. 7
7. The extinction of the dinosaurs was chosen as an example of a causal inquiry for two
reasons. Hart and Honor6 and many others who have written on causation, including Dray, have
argued that there is a common theme in the discussion of causation that runs through areas as
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Coase and Calabresi, the early proponents of the law and economics
perspective, do not ackknowledge causes in their analysis. They view the
causal question as essentially an explanatory inquiry. Causation does not
exist, and everything that purports to be causally related to a subsequent
event or state of affairs is an explanatory condition. Posner and the later
economic proponents see everything as an attributive cause. For them, all
causal questions have simply been collapsed into attributive questions.
Section IV uses the example of the changing tort liability of the social host to
illustrate the difficulty with the position of both contingents of economic
thought. This comment concludes by arguing that the causal myopia of the
economists effectively limits the kinds of answers they can obtain when
pursuing questions about legal responsibility and, consequently, will show the
importance of Hart and Honor&'s causal distinctions.
II
CAUSES, CONDITIONS, AND DINOSAURS
There is a debate among scientists about what caused the dinosaurs'
extinction. Scientists use causal language to explain the various forces that
altered the status quo, thereby causing the dinosaurs' extinction., Some have
argued that the dinosaurs died as a result of great climatic changes. Within
this explanation, two theories have been advanced. Some believe that a
meteor or comet hit the earth and created a kind of nuclear winter from which
the dinosaurs were unable to escape. 9 Others believe that other cyclical
climatic changes were too drastic for the dinosaur to survive.' 0 Another
explanation attributes the dinosaurs' extinction to the emergence of mammals
who ate dinosaur eggs." I Still other scientists contend that the inability of the
dinosaur to survive was a product of the inability of dinosaur genes to adapt
quickly enough to changed circumstances. 12 An economist might consider
diverse as history and law. To the extent there is a common theme it is important to understand how
the economists' views would be applied outside the legal framework. In addition, much of the
conflict in the literature on causation concerns disagreements about the substantive outcome of the
causal questions. The causal inquiry into the extinction of dinosaurs removes these substantive
issues from the debate about causation so that it is possible to focus on the issues about which the
economists differ from Hart and Honor&.
8. See, e.g., McLean, A Terminal Mesozoic "Greenhouse".- Lessons from the Past, 201 Sci. 401, 401
(1978) ("extinctions ... may have been caused in part by a decreasing equability of the climate")
(emphasis added); Officer & Drake, Terminal Cretaceous Environmental Events, 227 Sci. 1161, 1161
(1985) ("Although there is general agreement that the end of Cretaceous time is marked by one of
the most significant faunal and floral transitions in the Phanerozoic record, there is less agreement
about the causes. . . . The causes of biostraitgraphic changes are important not only in understanding
the physical development of the earth but also biological evolution.") (emphasis added).
9. Hsu, Terrestrial Catastrophe Caused by Cometary Impact at the End of Cretaceous, 285 NATURE 201
(1980).
10. See Alvarez, Alvarez, Asaro & Michel, Extraterrestrial Cause for Cretaceous-Tertiary Extinction, 208
Sci. 1095 (1980) (alternative causes of extinction of dinosaurs are listed and discussed, including
climatic conditions due to random or a cyclical coincidence of causative factors).
11. Jepson, Riddles of the Terrible Lizard, AM. SCIENTIST, June 1964, at 52, 52.
12. "Such a selective pattern [of extinction] seems to indicate an environmental stress that some
organisms were adapted to meet and others were not." McLean, supra note 8, at 401.
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the adaptability of genes as a function of how risk-averse the dinosaur is.
Risk-averse dinosaur genes would permit more diverse reactions to climatic
changes by, for example, providing for greater variation in the size of
dinosaur offspring. A final explanation, also attributable to 'the economists
perspective,' views the dinosaurs' extinction as a product of their level of
propagation and food consumption. From this perspective, the very act of
living increased the likelihood of the dinosaurs' extinction.
Applying Hart and Honor6's distinction between causes and mere
conditions to the dinosaur extinction problem helps illustrate the differences
among approaches to causal analysis. Hart and Honor6 argue that it is
possible to distinguish between causes and mere conditions based on three
factors.' 3 First, an event or occurrence is a cause if it is abnormal and,
therefore, distinguishable from the normal conditions that surround existing
circumstances. 14 Second, an event or occurrence is a cause and not a mere
condition if an individual has voluntarily produced it. 15 Third, an event or
occurrence is a cause and not a mere condition if it is in close temporal
proximity to the event.' 6
Applying Hart and Honor6's factors to the dinosaur causal nexus makes
clear that neither the dinosaurs' participation nor the failure of dinosaurs or
their genes to respond to climatic changes are causal factors. The reason is
that neither are abnormal conditions in Hart and Honor6's sense. The levels
of dinosaur propogation and food consumption are not causes because these
levels (assuming they did not change as a result of climatic forces) are part of
13. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORi, supra note 2, at 67-8 1; see Dray, supra note 3, at 14-15.
The Massachusetts courts in particular have used the distinction between mere condition and
cause.
The defense rests principally upon the fact that the plaintiff was intoxicated, and was incapable
of caring for himself after he was taken from the train, and therefore was not in the exercise of
due care. If his voluntary intoxication was a direct and proximate cause of the injury, he cannot
recover. The plaintiff contends that it was not a cause, but a mere condition, well known to the
defendant's servants, and that their act was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, with
which no other act or omission had any causal connection. The distinction here referred to is
well recognized in law. Negligence of a plaintiff at the time of an injury caused by the negligence
of another is no bar to his recovery from the other, unless it was a direct, contributing cause to
the injury, as distinguished from a mere condition, in the absence of which the injury would not
have occurred.
Black v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 193 Mass. 448, 450, 79 N.E. 797, 798 (1907).
The best minds often differ upon the question whether, in a given case, illegal conduct of a
plaintiff was a direct and proximate cause contributing with others to his injury, or was a mere
condition of it .... But, even in that case, external causes may have been so exclusive in their
operation, and so free from any relation to the position of the vehicle, as to have left that a mere
condition, without agency in producing the result ....
Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dep't, 146 Mass. 596, 602, 604, 16 N.E. 555, 558-59 (1888).
In Davies v. lann . . . the plaintiff negligently left his donkey in a public street, with his fore legs
fettered, and the defendant drove over him carelessly. It was held that the plaintiff could
recover, notwithstanding his negligence, it being a condition, but not a contributing cause, of his
injury.
Marble v. Ross, 129 Mass. 44, 48 (1878) (citation omitted).
14. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORS, supra note 2, at 67-68; see Dray supra note 3, at 14.
15. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, supra note 2, at 60-72; see Dray supra note 3. at 14.
16. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORg, supra note 2, at 70-74; see Dray supra note 3, at 14.
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the ordinary functioning of the organism. It is difficult to view normal
procreation and eating as being voluntary in any but the narrowest sense.
Similarly, dinosaur genes are immutable and, therefore, cannot be causes.
Certainly, dinosaurs had the option of expiring by not reproducing or
consuming vegetation, but such a restricted view of voluntary action is
inconsistent with the conventional moral notion that life-preserving activities
are not voluntary.
Hart and Honor6 would conclude that climatic conditions, either the
meteors or the abnormal seasonal changes, caused the dinosaurs' extinction.
The climatic changes that led to the demise of dinosaurs were abnormal for
the time period in which the dinosaurs had developed. If it took the dinosaur
50,000 years to develop as a species and during that time period there was not
a meteor shower of sufficient intensity to impact the dinosaur ecology, then
with respect to the dinosaurs' extinction the meteor is a cause. It is possible
to argue that there is always a small probability that meteors will strike the
earth with sufficient severity to create a kind of nuclear winter. If one accepts
this position, the meteor would not be viewed as abnormal. This perspective,
however, is outside Hart and Honor6's causal time frame. They would argue
that the explanatory causes of the dinosaurs' extinction were the climatic
changes that produced abnormal weather. A scientist trying to allocate causal
responsibility between the two theories of climatic changes by applying Hart
and Honor6's principles would have the difficult task of determining which
theory was correct.
The theory that egg-eating mammals caused, in Hart and Honor6's terms,
the demise of dinosaurs, is also based on the identification of a cause as
opposed to a mere condition. Eating dinosaur eggs instead of other things is
an action by a voluntary biological party 17 and is in close proximity to the
decline of dinosaurs. Hart and Honor still have the task of investigating
empirically to determine whether the factor contributed to dinosaur
extinction, that is, whether mammals actually did eat dinosaur eggs. But once
the causal decision maker clears that hurdle, no real questions remain.
Professor Dray finds that Hart and Honor6's distinction between causes
and mere conditions is problematic. He argues that the perspective of the
party is important in defining what is voluntary and abnormal. For example,
the victim of a sub-Saharan drought may view her inability to get food as a
product of the weather, but international authorities may view it as a product
of the local government's negligence in not foreseeing the effects of cyclical
drought conditions and not storing food in anticipation of this foreseeable
event.' 8 In each instance, the facts and circumstances considered in need of
explanation by the party analyzing the malady affects the determination of
what caused the malady.
17. One may object to the characterization of animals as having "free wills," or at least to the
notion that animals are capable of voluntary action. Within the context of this example, however, it
seems reasonable to attribute voluntary notions to both dinosaurs and mammals.
18. Dray, supra note 3, at 17.
[Vol. 49: No. 3
CAUSATION, ECONOMISTS, AND DINOSAURS
The problem of perspective can be generalized because all causal decision
makers are limited by the nature and kind of facts with which they are
presented. In trying to achieve the goal to which the causal inquiry is directed
(preventing future drought, for instance, or assigning responsibility for the
present drought), the causal decision maker is limited by the facts and
circumstances that affect his perspective. He can alter his perspective to some
extent by augmenting the available information, but cannot alter the
limitations of his causal position. Accordingly, judges, like historians,
biologists, and economists are influenced by their own perspectives. These
causal decision makers can only determine causal responsibility in the context
within which the legal, historical, economic, or biological facts exist. The
determination of causal responsibility changes with the causal decision maker
because each decision maker has a different perspective. Consequently, there
is an indeterminacy in causal responsibility. It is not surprising that as judges
have become less important in determining responsibility in traditional
common law areas, approaches to causal responsibility have changed. In
addition, as legislatures and administrative agencies have become more
important in defining social responsibility the focus of debate has shifted to
different concerns. 19
The dinosaur example poses similar problems of perspective. In order to
view climatic changes as causes, a causal decision maker must have a
particular causal perspective. A climatic circumstance that is abnormal when
viewed within a ten-year frame may be normal when viewed from the
perspective of centuries or longer. From the perspective of an era, the
presence of a comet or meteor or an unusual run of weather are normal and
expected events. Therefore, causal responsibility cannot be assigned to them.
For Hart and Honor6, determining a normal time period depends on the type
of causal inquiry. If the inquiry is an explanatory one, the normal time period
is that in which the explanatory inquirer is looking for causal answers. If the
inquiry is an attributive one, the time period is that in which the causal
inquirer is able to apply the causal goals of his inquiry. These time periods
may or may not be the same, but they demonstrate the extent to which
attributive and explanatory questions may overlap in the causal inquiry.
In order to understand the importance of causal goals and causal decision
makers, it is important to examine their implication for Hart and Honor6's
notions of attributive and explanatory causes. Once the causal decision maker
is assigned, the scope of the explanatory inquiry is determined. The
parameters of the inquiry are also set when the questions for decision are
defined. For example, in a tort case the questions put to a common law judge
are different in magnitude from the issues placed before an administrative
agency. The kind and amount of data a court may collect to answer questions
are more restricted than an administrative agency may collect. Furthermore,
19. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW IN AN AGE OF STATUTES 44-79, 163-66 (1982).
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courts are limited by the facts of the case before them, whereas administrative
agencies are free to weigh broader policy considerations.
When a judge attempts to determine whether a water company or an
aggrieved homeowner ought to bear the consequences of an unprecedented
frost, he cannot measure the prospective consequences of his decision. 20 The
judge cannot know in advance whether placing the burden of the damage on
the water company will force it out of business, or if the price of water will
increase so much that some consumers will need to reduce their consumption.
Similarly, the judge cannot know whether placing liability on the homeowner
will, in the long run, lead homeowners to organize neighborhood watches to
prevent damage to their water hydrants during unprecedented frosts. In
contrast, an administrative agency can determine the best means of solving
the problem by undertaking empirical research and implementing temporary
rules. Thus, the scope of the explanatory inquiry increases as the causal
decision maker moves from the courts to administrative agencies. Similarly,
the scope of explanatory inquiry increases where judges, not juries, decide
issues because the juries are more limited in their ability to examine causal
questions than are judges. 2' This analysis demonstrates that the scope of
decision making is defined by the chosen causal decision maker.
Similarly, when the decision maker chooses a causal goal he also
determines the attributive inquiry. For example, a historian will view the
question of who caused the Mexican-American War of 1846 differently if his
goal is to enable nations to retain a certain amount of national pride than if he
regards national pride as outside the permissible goals of historical analysis. 22
20. See Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856) (holding
that the waterworks company was not liable for the consequences of an unprecedented and
unforeseeable frost); see also infra text accompanying note 27.
21. This can be seen in the way in which the Restatement (Second) of Torts treats the role of the
judge and jury in deciding issues of negligence. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C
(1965) with id. § 328B.
§ 328B. Functions of Court
In an action for negligence the court determines
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably
find the existence or non-existence of such facts;
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal duty on the part of the defendant;
(c) the standard of conduct required of the defendant by his legal duty;
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to that standard, in any case in which the jury may
not reasonably come to a different conclusion;
(e) the applicability of any rules of law determining whether the defendant's conduct is a
legal cause of harm to the plaintiff; and
() whether the harm claimed to be suffered by the plaintiff is legally compensable.
§ 328C. Functions of Jury
In an Action for negligence the jury determines, in any case in which different conclusions may
be reached on the issue:
(a) the facts,
(b) whether the defendant has conformed to the standard of conduct required by the law,
(c) whether the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the harm to the plaintiff, and
(d) the amount of compensation for legally compensable harm.
22. Dray suggests that Graebner's discussion of the causes of the Mexican-American War of
1846 could be viewed quite differently. Dray, supra note 3, at 19. Graebner argues that the United
States was responsible for the war because when there is a conflict between a strong power and a
weaker one, unless the weaker capitulates, the stronger power insists on war. Graebner concedes
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It is not possible for causal decision makers to determine questions of
attributive causation independently of their causal goals. Attributive
causation and causal goals are opposite sides of the same question. Once the
historian as a causal decision maker chooses the goal, he has locked himself
into a decision.
The application of Hart and Honor's notions of causation to the problem
of the extinction of dinosaurs also illustrates how choosing a goal influences
the decision maker's conclusions. The climatologist's explanatory inquiry is
different from the explanatory inquiry of the paleontologist. In order for a
paleontologist to consider climatic factors as explanatory causes or
conditions, a climatologist must determine whether those factors are within
the causal inquiry. Even if climatic factors are brought within the inquiry,
however, the paleontologist and the climatologist may view the attributive
question of what constitutes a cause or condition differently. Similarly, the
causal decision maker's determination as to what constitutes an attributive
cause will change with the nature of the causal goals. In the case of the
extinction of the dinosaurs, causal decision makers get different answers
depending on whether they ask how alteration of the status quo led to the
dinosaurs' extinction, or whether they ask what causal factors could have been
altered to allow the dinosaur to survive. Adopting the first causal goal leads
the decision maker to conclude that the attributive causes were the climatic or
other changes that altered the status quo. The second causal goal permits the
decision maker to include in the attributive causes the possibility that the
dinosaurs' genes or their actions contributed to their extinction. By defining
the causal goal, the causal decision maker limits the range of attributive causes
of the dinosaurs' extinction.
III
ECONOMISTS AND CAUSATION
Hart and Honor6 believe that the distinction between causes and
conditions centers primarily on retrospective considerations, that is, how
current causal issues will influence settled questions. Abnormality,
voluntariness, and temporal connection 23 are all retrospective considerations
of what produced given results. Modern law and economics theorists 2 4 view
that the Mexican government engaged in provocative actions, but contends that the Mexican
government had the right to insist as a matter of pride that it would not capitulate. Dray suggests
that this argument demonstrates the difficulty of the use of causal goals. Graebner uses a value
system to establish both the conditions (for example, the actions of the Mexican government), and
causes (for example, the several alternatives available to the United States government) of the war.
23. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORt, supra note 2, at 26-61.
24. The modern law and economics movement owes a great deal to the intellectual efforts of
various "noneconomic" thinkers. In particular, much of the "law and economics" literature is a
product of concerns that were voiced by the legal realists, and at least some can be traced back
indirectly to Holmes and other precursors to the legal realist movement. See, e.g., G. GILMORE, THE
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 99-106 (1977) (realists understood and used social science in an attempt to
explain the law as a search for a single correct theory of law); H. POHLMAN, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL
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the issues quite differently. 25 The key issues for them are prospective, that is,
they are concerned with the implications of their view of causation on future
situations.
One might argue that economists have provided the courts with a
definition of causation by defining wealth maximization or social welfare
maximization as the appropriate causal goal. Although economists
understand that there is an inherent conflict between corrective justice and
social welfare, they choose social welfare maximization as a goal. Economists
use the term "cause" to explain those factors that contribute in any way to
economic efficiency, wealth, or social welfare. The definition of cause is not
appropriate, however, for two reasons. First, there are not clear, available
wealth-maximizing or efficiency-producing solutions available for judicial or
other decision makers. The economic theory of the "second best" 26 suggests
that it is impossible on the basis of theory to decide unambiguously what will
in fact contribute to wealth maximization or social welfare. Accordingly,
economic efficiency, social welfare, and wealth maximization are likely to
remain undefined in judicial decision making. Second, even if courts specify
completely the conditions of social welfare maximization, those
determinations do not thereby produce a definition of causation. The reason
is that economists' allocation of liability is separated from the causal question.
The water damage case discussed above2 7 illustrates that the goals of
social welfare or wealth maximization do not by themselves inform the court
how to determine causation. These goals do not help the court choose
between a negligence standard, which would require the innocent landowner
HOLMES & UTILITARIAN JURISPRUDENCE 164-65 (1984) (legal realists owe much to Holmes's universal
theory of liability).
The rationale for talking about the law and economics theorists in connection with an analysis of
causation is that commentaries use the "language" of the law and economics movement. As a
defense to the charge that this analysis is ahistorical, I would point out that most current legal
thinking is not analyzed in terms of Holmes' and Frank's theories. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw
(188 l);J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL (1949). Courts and commentators now reference Calabresi's and
Posner's theories. See G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw (1977).
25. In their preface to the second edition of Causation in the Law, Hart and Honor6 discuss the
differences between their views and the views of several prominent law and economics theorists.
H.L.A. HART & A. HONOR , supra note 2, at lxviii-lxxvii (arguing that the economists are causal
minimalists); see supra text accompanying note 5.
26. The theory of the second best states that "it is not true that a situation in which more, but not
all, of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely to be, superior to a
situation in which fewer are fulfilled." Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV.
ECON. STUD. 11, 12 (1956). In general, the theory states that social welfare will not be increased
automatically by using the results of an economic analysis that is geared toward realizing optimum
conditions. When all of the assumed optimum conditions are not met in reality, it is possible that
efforts to meet one of the optimum conditions will worsen social welfare. In short, social welfare is
not maximized by merely maximizing the number of optimal conditions which are met. For a
discussion of this theory from a legal perspective see Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict
Products Liability: Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036 (1980); Markovits,
A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy in Our Worse- Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related
Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 WIsc. L. REV. 950.
27. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., II Ex. 781, 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1856); see supra text
accompanying note 20.
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to bear the cost of the water damage, and a strict liability standard, which
would require the water company and, ultimately, its customers to bear the
cost. Since the economists have drained causation of its meaning, they are
not able to say whether either standard appropriately places liability on the
causally responsible party. The indeterminacy stems not from the particular
example, but utilization of a goal that fails to take account of important values
other than economics or social welfare maximization. Traditional legal
causation analysis evaluates the individual outcomes relative to the particular
participants in a proceeding. In contrast, social welfare maximization
eliminates the comparison of individuals because it is potentially inconsistent
with the independent goal of social welfare maximization to worry about
individual outcomes.
Both the early and later economists start with the same instrumental goal
of economic efficiency, but they define causation differently. The difference
between the early economists, Coase and Calabresi, and the later economists,
Landes, Posner, Shavell, and Polinsky, however, is that Coase and Calabresi
would argue that causation does not exist apart from the economic goals
chosen. They do not deny that causation may exist for moral or other
purposes, but they would question whether the traditional notion of causation
can be used to achieve social welfare through the attribution of liability in a
legal setting. The early economic theorists view the the causal inquiry as
purely explanatory and attributively irrelevant. For example, the factors that
contributed to the water damage in the above illustration are definable, but
the explanation is irrelevant for attributive purposes. The later economic
theorists, however, make a different argument that causation does exist and
that it is possible to define causation in economic terms.
The later economic theorists would argue that either the water works
company or the homeowner caused the accident by taking insufficient
precautions. Liability should be assigned based purely on whether one or the
other party contributed to the accident in a wealth-maximizing or economic
efficiency sense. The homeowner and the water works company both
contributed to the accident, and liability is attributable to them based upon
their contribution to economic efficiency or wealth. Thus, causation has been
reduced to wealth maximization or economic efficiency. This notion of
attributive causation is so broad, however, that it destroys causation as an
effective means of discrimination. This economic perspective does not permit
the causal inquirer to distinguish causal from contributing factors.
Economists may help to define negligence standards by demonstrating
their impact on economic goals. The Learned Hand formula, which balances
the cost of precautions against the likelihood and gravity of harm, has helped
some courts to determine negligence. 28 The formula, however, does not
produce a definition of causation that distinguishes between causal factors.
28. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Learned Hand
proposed a formula for determining negligence that balanced the burden of adequate precautions
(B) with the product of the probability of harm (P) and the gravity of harm (L). If B > PL, the party
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The only question that a court applying Hand's formula must decide is whose
actions-the alleged tortfeasor's or the victim's-contributed to a diminution
in social welfare. The calculation of economic costs may require the court to
conclude that the actions of the alleged tortfeasor are a cause even if, for
example, the relationship between the alleged tortfeasor and victim is very
attenuated. The conclusion that the alleged tortfeasor has been negligent
lacks the notion of wrongfulness if it is based only on the cost of avoiding the
accident. The economists' approach thus removes moral issues from the
causal inquiry.
Consideration of four economists' views on causation illustrates the lack of
moral perspective in the economists' approach. Coase, for example, views the
causal inquiry as primarily explanatory. 29 Coase would inquire about the
causes of an event to determine how the event in question occurred. The
attributive causal inquiry, however, does not exist for him. In addition, Coase
is unable to distinguish between cause and conditions. Just as the attributive
question is outside the causal inquiry, the question whether an event is a cause
or a condition does not exist. Rather, Coase has collapsed the causal inquiry
into a single question about explanatory conditions. The assignment of
causal goals and decision makers is irrelevant because any causal choices
made are subject to the intervention of individual responses and the market.
Consider, for example, the common law judge who assigns liability in the
water damage case to the water works company. In that case, either the
judge's decision will be thwarted by the response of individuals to the
decision, or it will become irrelevant to the outcome because it will simply
produce the same result as would have been produced by market forces and
individual responses.
Individual responses thwart the assignment of liability by adjusting market
values so as to render the assignment of liability irrelevant. For example,
assume that there is a rule that imposes liability on ranchers for their roaming
cattle. The ranchers may nevertheless find it economically attractive to sell
out to farmers whose crops are damaged by the cattle instead of risking
liability. The market's measurement of the relative value of their competing
interests will determine if the rancher and the farmer will peacefully coexist or
if one will buy out the other. Since the assignment of liability does not
influence the market's measurement of value, it will not influence the end
position of farmers and ranchers. If the market cannot work effectively,
however, then the assignment of liability to the rancher matters. Regardless
of the fact that an assignment to the wrong party will affect economic
efficiency, assigning liability does not matter because the result will be
compared to the result that would have been achieved in the market through
individual action.
who did not take the adequate precautions would be held accountable for the injury. See also American Hosp.
Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prod. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 608-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (Swygert, dissenting).
29. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcON. 1 (1960); see also H.L.A. HART & A.
HONOR9, supra note 2, at lxx-lxxi.
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Applying this analysis to the dinosaur example illustrates that, for Coase,
all of the potential causal explanations are simply conditions. Since all of the
five factors identified as possible causes 30 are potentially mutable each factor
is also potentially fully responsible. The biologist's or the judge's choice of
which factor caused the dinosaur's extinction may be irrelevant to the
outcome since individual action will lead to the same outcome irrespective of
the allocation of liability. Alternatively, the causal decision maker has the
difficult task of attempting to replicate the result that would have been
achieved if markets worked appropriately. Accordingly, the question in the
dinosaur example is simply an instrumental one: Will the market results be
altered by the assignment of causal responsibility? If the answer is no, then
from the Coasian perspective all of the potential factors are simply conditions
and there is no cause. If the answer is yes, then any or all of the factors could
be responsible. Cause in an attributive sense, then, does not exist.
Calabresi has developed an analogous view of the law. 31 Calabresi says
that in order to attribute causation to a particular factor, the causal decision
maker must engage in a complicated calculus to create a hierarchy of causal
factors.3 2 In determining how to allocate causation among the five factors in
the dinosaur example, the causal decision maker would choose the factor (or
factors) that, if altered, would have imposed the lowest social cost on society.
Although there are competing goals like equity and loss spreading, they
conflict with the goal of minimizing cost and, therefore, are irrelevant. 33
Liability is determined not by causal relationship, but by the complicated
calculation of whose actions cost society the most. In making this calculation
the causal decision maker does not address the attributive question at all. To
the extent that cause enters into the least cost-avoider analysis, it is as a means
of explaining the causal relationship. Thus, under Calabresi's analysis, all five
of the factors which could have been causes are explanatory conditions.
Unlike Coase, Calabresi is not certain that the market is always the best
measure of the social calculus. He would rely instead on legislatures and, to a
lesser extent, on the courts to attribute liability. For both Calabresi and
Coase, however, the causal inquiry is separate from the attributive question.
The causal inquiry is simply an explanatory process; attribution is left to more
powerful forces.
Landes and Posner view the question of how to allocate liability
differently. 34 For them, all five factors are attributive causes. The task for the
decision maker determining causation is to decide which causes, among all the
30. See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
31. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961). For
Hart and Honor6's comments on Calabresi, see H.L.A. HART & A. HONORf, supra note 2, at lxxi-
lxxiii.
32. Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L.
REV. 69, at 73-91 (1975). For a thoughtful discussion of Calabresi, see Wright, Actual Causation v.
Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1985).
33. Calabresi, supra note 32.
34. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 109. For a response to Posner, see H.L.A. HART & A.
HONOR9, supra note 2, at xviii.
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potential causes, should bear liability, when the instrumental goal is wealth
maximization. Landes and Posner would allocate liability based on how much
these causal factors contributed to the loss of societal wealth.3 5 The rule for
assigning liability takes from those who contributed to the diminution of
societal welfare and gives to those who were damaged. The market
determines this allocation. In the dinosaur example, genes could be the cause
of the dinosaurs' failure to confront the potential vagaries of climate
successfully. Not only could the dinosaur have caused its injury, but it has
contributed at some level to the injury. The causal inquiry is attributive, and
seeks to determine the party that in a wealth maximizing sense, should be held
liable for the injuries. Since the goal of the causal decision maker is clear and
not in conflict with other concerns, it is possible to define exactly the
responsible parties and the level of their liability.
Shavell and Polinsky have extended a similar model of economic analysis
to issues of participation 36 and risk aversion3 7 (issues not directly recognized
by either Calabresi or Coase). Shavell's and Polinsky's views are similar to
those of Landes and Posner with one main exception: they replace the goal of
wealth maximization with economic efficiency. 38 The causal decision maker's
task is to determine how to allocate liability among all of the causes that
produced the results in order to achieve economic efficiency. Since Polinsky
and Shavell have adopted economic efficiency as the goal of the causal
inquiry, causation exists only in an attributive sense. All contributing factors
are attributive causes. The weight of attribution is determined by empirical
facts. In examining the dinosaur problem, they would ask how to apportion
liability among the responsible causes in order to achieve economic efficiency.
Dinosaurs might be charged with responsibility because they could have
developed selfish genes that would have adapted to future climatic changes or
could have altered their body sizes to reduce their participation in the risk-
35. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 110-11.
36. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
37. Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM.
ECON. REV. 880 (1979); Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9J.
LEGAL STUD. 463 (1980). The Shavell and Polinsky model is explained in greater detail and with
examples in A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983).
38. The difference between wealth maximization and economic efficiency has been the subject of
much debate among economists and lawyer economists. Economic efficiency implies that one is
pareto efficient-it is not posssible to make any individual better off without making someone else
worse off. This requirement, while superficially attractive, is extremely difficult to apply in policy
situations. It is this policy implementation problem which has led people like Posner to adopt wealth
maximization as a goal. Wealth maximization requires that whatever change is instituted increases
the net wealth of society. Wealth maximization violates pareto principles of economic efficiency in
two very important ways. First, a rule of wealth maximization does not require that everyone be
made better off by a change in a liability rule. Second, a wealth maximization rule measures the
change of value in terms of wealth. Since wealth is dependent on initial distributions of resources
and individual choices, wealth maximization is not equivalent to society maximizing individual utility
in the pareto-efficient sense.
For a defense of wealth maximization as a value see POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 60-119
(1981); Johnsen, Wealth is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1986). But see Dworkin, Why Efficiency? 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980) (wealth is an unappealing ethical basis for legal decisions); Kronman,
Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
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creating activity. Similarly, mammals might be charged with the responsibility
for the dinosaurs' extinction if their actions contributed in any way to that
extinction. By eating dinosaur eggs, for example, mammals may have
reduced the genetic diversity of the dinosaur population.
How economists view causal questions demonstrates the importance of
defining the causal goal and the causal decision maker. The views of Hart and
Honor and the four economists discussed above in terms of the dinosaur
problem are outlined in Table 1. The last three columns show what each of
these theorists believes ought to be the causal goal, who ought to be the
causal decision maker, and whether the inquiry is attributive or explanatory.
Each of the economists views the causal goal as substantially a product of the
market.
For Coase, Landes, and Posner, the Chicago contingent, the market alone
defines the causal goal of the tort system.39 Calabresi, Shavell, and Polinsky
theoretically permit other concerns to enter into the equation, but for each of
them, the market is ultimately the only appropriate measuring instrument.
Calabresi argues that the determination of causal goals should be left to
legislatures or administrative agencies because they are in a better position
than are the courts to determine the market result.40 Shavell and Polinsky
recognize that it would be difficult for courts to determine :he result the
market would have produced, and therefore argue that the appropriate results
depend critically on the empirical facts in the system.4'
Each of the economists connects his causal goal to a causal decision maker
who is in the best position to achieve that goal. The problem with the
economists' perspective can be seen in the way each of these theorists
approaches Hart and Honor6's distinction between cause and condition.
Calabresi and Coase would view each of the five factors in the dinosaur
example as mere conditions, not causes. These factors are part of the
background information from which the causal decision maker can decide
how to replicate the market. In order to view the factors as mere conditions,
however, the causal decision maker must disconnect the causal inquiry from
the assignment of liability. As a consequence, causation in the attributive
sense does not exist. A factor may contribute to an event but not be part of
the attributive process. As long as the attributive process is able to achieve its
causal goal, the causal connection is irrelevant.
Landes, Posner, Shavell, and Polinsky would view each of the five factors
as an attributive cause because each factor contributed to the extinction of the
dinosaur. The causal decision maker must decide how to allocate liability
among the attributive causes. According to these theorists, liability should be
allocated according to how each factor contributed to (or detracted from)
39. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 110.
40. See Calabresi, supra note 32, at 84-100. Calabresi notes that there are multiple goals for the
tort system, but he has difficulty working those goals into causal language. These other goals
ultimately are decided after cause is defined. Calabresi, supra note 32, at 105-08.
41. See, e.g., A. POLINSKY, supra note 37, at 123-26.
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CAUSATION, ECONOMISTS, AND DINOSAURS
wealth maximization or social welfare. Explanatory and attributive conditions
are indistinguishable because, at least within the realm of choices available to
causal decision makers, all factors are causes. The inquiry for these
economists is purely attributive, confined to determining what factors effect
changes in wealth or economic efficiency.
Table 1 illustrates weakness of the economists' view of causation. The
economists have collapsed causation into either explanatory conditions or
attributive causes. The causal decision maker is left with little means by which
to distinguish conditions from causes. Although Calabresi and Polinsky
explicitly discuss including other values in causal decision making,42 each
ultimately ignores the kinds of questions that Hart and Honor6 raise with
respect to causes and conditions. The reason for the omission is clear. The
economists are primarily focusing on prospective concerns. These concerns
do not allow for considerations of individual justice. According to Landes and
Posner, "causation becomes a result rather than a premise of the economic
analysis of accidents." 43 If the courts should include considerations of
individual equity in their decision making, however, they need to distinguish
between causes and conditions. Of the theorists discussed in this comment,
only Hart and Honor6 make that distinction.44
The economists' perspective can increase the number of issues that causal
decision makers examine. For example, the argument that a potential
tortfeasor or victim can produce injury by increasing his or her participation
in an activity is less likely to arise in Hart and Honor6's scheme than in the
economists' scheme. Because economists focus on the impact court decisions
have on social welfare, they ignore the actions of individuals. In contrast,
Hart and Honor6's concerns focus on the actions of individuals. Even when
not discussing moral actors, however, Hart and Honor6 can meaningfully
42. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-35 (student ed. 1970); A. POLINSKY, supra note
37, at 7-10.
43. Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 110.
44. The courts' equitable assignment of liability in other areas of the law is similarly dependent
on the distinction between causes and conditions. See, e.g., Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98
HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985). George Fletcher argues that legal systems that focus on reasonableness
fail to draw a crucial distinction between wrongfulness and responsibility, and that this problem also
exists in American criminal law. He concludes that American law is concerned with the notion of
reasonableness, whereas the law in other countries distinguishes between wrongfulness and
responsibility, that is, between justification and excuse. Fletcher notes that the flat notion of
reasonableness prevalent in American law cannot distinguish meaningfully between various kinds of
defenses to criminal activity. He divides these defenses into those that are primarily concerned with
wrongfulness (the absence of justification) and with responsibility (the absence of excuse).
If Fletcher's notions are applied to the concept of causes and conditions, it is clear that conditions
are events or actions that are responsible but not wrongful. Normal things are not causes of actions
because they are part of the background. Similarly, actions that are not voluntary are not wrongful,
even when they are responsible actions (for example, when they are causally connected). In contrast
to conditions, causes are those actions that are both wrongful and responsible. Just as Fletcher finds
much of American law to be flat and incapable of producing the distinctions that notions of
wrongfulness and responsibility dictate, I find that the economic analysis of tort liability is similarly
flat and incapable of distinguishing between those actions that are wrongful but are responsible.
Economists who write about tort law have collapsed the concerns of tort law into a one-dimensional
analysis that is ultimately not helpful to courts.
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distinguish between causes and conditions. For example, Hart and Honor6,
could argue that the dinosaurs' eating and procreating habits are not causes
because they are involuntary. The question whether the actions are causes is
meaningful to them.
A decision maker following Hart and Honor6's model is unlikely to ask
whether certain actions are causes even in situations where the participation
of the tortfeasor or the victim is important. Take the example of the
automobile driver who drives carefully (nonnegligently) but frequently. The
chance that such a driver might in fact hurt an innocent pedestrian might be
the same as for the driver who drives negligently but infrequently. 45 This
second order problem is ignored in most tort law or, at least, in negligence
situations. The causal decision maker following Hart and Honor6 simply
would not view the tortfeasor's or the victim's frequency of participation in
the activity as an issue. The traditional common law justification for not
taking the participation factor into account is that tort law need not resolve all
of society's problems and that regulation through insurance rates and other
procedures can solve some of the problems.46 The objective of the traditional
tort system is justice, not social welfare. From the perspective of maximizing
45. For a further discussion of this problem see, A. POLINSKY, supra note 37, at 38-49. This
discussion draws much of its inspiration from Shavell, supra note 36.
46. Indeed, in some areas tort law has attempted to induce the potential tortfeasor to take
account of such liability, most notably by making product manufacturers strictly liable for the injuries
caused by their products. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 401A (1977). To the extent that
product manufacturers are strictly liable, they will take account of some of these participation issues.
Thus, this tort law rule reflects concerns that are also of central importance to the economist. While
these concerns certainly predate the recent contributions of economists to the literature on tort law,
it is increasingly clear that these concerns contributed to the modern law and economics movement.
See R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 26-30 (1980).
The development of strict product liability is therefore a useful focus for tracing the growing
importance of economic analysis in the law of torts. In the Restatement of Torts, absolute liability was
imposed only in cases involving livestock and operators of ultrahazardous activities. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS §§ 504-24 (1938). Accidents involving products used by consumers or business were
covered by negligence standards. Id. §§ 308-408. No provision was made for strict product liability,
and negligence was discussed in noneconomic terms. See, e.g., id. at § 391, comment a (liability "may
often be avoided by giving . . . the information necessary to enable it to be safely used, or to afford
those who are to use it an opportunity to decide whether to do so or not"). This is the traditional
reasonable man standard which does not account for the economic cost of safety devices, warnings,
or the results of not using the device or heeding the warnings. In contrast, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts states that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A)(1)
(1965). The purpose of the rule is to hold the seller liable for the use of his products, even though
he has used all possible care in the preparation and sale of the products. Id. comments a, f.
Section 402(A) was designed to meet the inadequacy of contractual remedies such as breach of
warranty, and as such it was based on an efficiency argument that the business person was best able
to care for both the product and potential harm caused by the product. Section 402(A) is applicable
to the business person rather than the individual involved in an occasional sale not only because the
business person has a "special responsibility" to the public, but also because business can more
efficiently pay the costs incurred (by insuring and passing on costs of accidents to consumers in the
form of higher prices). To the extent that § 402(A) relies on the efficiency argument, the section is
attentive to the participation issues that are at the heart of the economists' analysis. See Page, Generic
Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853 (1983).
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society's welfare, however, the grandmother who carefully but frequently
drives her automobile up and down the street is a social concern.
Hart and Honor6 as well as the common law courts are concerned with
retrospective considerations of responsibility. Retrospective concerns are
vindicated by looking for the causal agent in Hart and Honor6's traditional
sense. Hart and Honor6 define the causal agent as the nearest voluntary,
responsible party.47 At common law an injured plaintiff could not sue a
defendant if a voluntary action by an independent agent intervened between
the action of the potential defendant and the injury of the plaintiff. For
example, a landlord was not responsible for injuries to a tenant where a third-
party criminal intervened. 48 Similarly, a police officer injured in a collision
with a stolen automobile could not sue the owner for negligence even though
the owner had left the keys in the ignition in a high crime area.49 In both
cases, the voluntary action of an independent third party intervened. To the
common law court, the actions of the landlord and the car owner are merely
conditions and not causes.
This notion of the nearest voluntary responsible party as a cause can be
applied to determine whether mammals caused the extinction of dinosaurs.
To Hart and Honor6, the proximity to the dinosaurs' extinction of the
mammals' choosing to eat dinosaur eggs instead of something else would lead
to the conclusion that the mammals caused their extinction. This view of
causation, however, has not prevailed in modern decisions where causal
relationships matter, as can be seen in tort liability areas as diverse as product
defects 50 and automobile accidents. 5 1
IV
CAUSATION AND THE SOCIAL HOST
The common law courts' changing focus with respect to causation can be
seen clearly in the extension of liability to social hosts who provide alcoholic
beverages to individuals who subsequently injure third parties. The common
law rule that the subsequent injury is too attenuated to lead to liability against
the social host was first tempered by extending liability to adults who
provided alcoholic beverages to minors. 52 This extension to social hosts who
47. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORS, supra note 2, at 60-72.
48. See Trentacost v. Brussel, 82 N.J. 214, 412 A.2d 436 (1980) (altering the common law rule to
extend liability to landlords in some situations involving third party criminals). For a precursor to
the modern extension, see Brauer v. New York Cent. & H. R.R. Co., 91 N.J.L. 190, 103 A. 166 (1918)
(because defendant railroad failed to protect plaintiff's freight, railroad is liable for the consequences
of foreseeable criminal intervention by a third party).
49. See Hill v. Yaskin, 75 N.J. 139, 380 A.2d 1107 (1977) (suit against car owner remanded for
development of facts on duty of car owner).
50. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. 90 NJ. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982) (product
manufacturers are liable even if manufacturer did not know of possible harm).
51. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); see also infra text accompanying
notes 55-59.
52. Sutter v. Hutchings, 254 Ga. 194, 327 S.E.2d 716 (1985) (social host who provides alcoholic
beverages to a minor may be liable to third party injured as a result); Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super.
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serve minors was based on traditional notions of causation and responsibility.
The reasoning underlying these decisions is that because a minor might not
be aware of the consequences of driving while intoxicated, the adult social
host who provided liquor to a minor knowing that the minor would soon be
driving was the closest responsible individual. This reasoning is similar to the
reasoning underlying statutory rules that make commercial vendors liable for
injuries to third parties resulting from the behavior of obviously intoxicated
customers served liquor by the vendors. 53 The statutes are premised on the
belief that one may reasonably conclude that an establishment serving
obviously intoxicated customers causes the patron's later behavior. The
reason is that a commercial establishment that provides liquor to an obviously
drunk patron knows the danger that action holds for others, and the
intoxicated patron may no longer be in a condition to accept voluntarily and
responsibly the consequences of his actions. In addition, these statutory
provisions often make the dram shop strictly liable for a particular set of
consequences. 54 In Hart and Honor&'s terms the closest voluntary actor is the
commercial vendor. The social host who provides liquor to an adult, on the
other hand, has no special expertise and is likely to be no more aware of the
potential ensuing dangers than the intoxicated guest. In terms of traditional
notions of causation, there is no reason to hold the social host responsible.
Accordingly, serving liquor to social guests is not abnormal, but serving
liquor to intoxicated customers is. To the extent that they focused on the
questions of causation and responsibility, the common law courts used Hart
and Honor6's traditional concepts to determine liability.
A number of courts have moved beyond the traditional common law
approach to adopt a model based upon a notion of causation similar to that
advanced by the law and economics school. In Kelly v. Gwinnell,55 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that a social host who provides liquor to an adult
social guest, knowing that the guest will thereafter be operating a motor
vehicle, is liable to third parties injured as a result of his intoxicated use of the
motor vehicle. The court rejected traditional causation. The court did not
reason that the intoxicated guest lacked responsibility or that, at some level of
intoxication, the host and not the driver could be held liable because the
212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976) (social host who provides alcoholic beverages to a minor, knowing the
minor was about to drive a car on the public highways, may be liable to third parties injured as a
result); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (social host who provides
alcoholic beverages to minors is liable to third parties for injuries caused as a result of that action).
But see Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468 (Minn. 1985) (statute does not permit extension of
liability to social host who provides alcoholic beverages to minors).
53. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 NJ. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Sharp, Dram Shop Laws and Problems, 28
ALA. LAw. 409 (1967); Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act: New Found Liability of the Social Host, 49
N.D.L. REV. 67 (1972).
54. Sharp, supra note 53, at 410-11.
55. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). But see McGuiggan v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 398
Mass. 152, 159-62, 496 N.E.2d 141, 145-46 (1986) (holding that liability of social hosts should be
determined by common law principles).
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intoxicated guest, like a minor, could not be responsible. 56 Instead, the court
focused on the social costs of drunk driving, stating: "When the court
determines that a duty exists and liability will be extended, it draws judicial
lines based on fairness and policy. In a society where thousands of deaths are
caused each year by drunken drivers ... the imposition of such a duty by the
judiciary . . . is both consistent with and supportive of a social goal-the
reduction of drunken driving .... -57 Thus, the causal question folded into
larger tort law concerns of deterrence and risk spreading.58 When the court
adopted the perspective of the law and economics school of social policy, it
abandoned Hart and Honor6's notion of causation.
Adopting the law and economics perspective, however, does not
necessarily imply complete rejection of Hart and Honor6's distinction
between causes and conditions. When courts use social policy in judicial
decision making, they must distinguish between those factors to which
responsibility should be attached, and those that contribute in some way but
should be ignored. Tort law has altered the focus of concerns. Under Hart
and Honor6's model, the court, as causal decision maker, would focus on the
questions of voluntariness, proximity, and abnormality. The purpose of these
tests is to impose liability for the costs of the injury on the individual who has
caused it. Policy goals are, secondarily, products of these rules. For common
law courts following the law and economics approach, individual justice is a
secondary consequence resulting from the maximization of social welfare.
The Kelly case also illustrates the importance of defining social goals and
the causal decision maker. When the Kelly court shifted its goal from the
traditional common law concern of individual responsibility to the
maximization of social welfare, what constituted a cause and a condition
changed. The court now views the actions of social hosts, which it had
traditionally seen as mere conditions, as causes. If the causal goal is social
welfare maximization as that term is defined by the majority in Kelly and law
and economics writers, then the court must maximize welfare. The dissent in
Kelly argues against imposing a common law rule on social hosts. He argues
that, due to its perspective, the court is not the proper body to make this
determination. 59 Rather, the legislature is in a better position to appreciate
the social costs of drunk driving and devise the appropriate rule. 60 The
56. For an example of a New Jersey court that did make this argument, see Figuly v. Knoll, 185
N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (1982) (bartender who serves drinks to known alcoholics may be liable
for injuries to third parties).
57. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 544-45, 476 A.2d 1219, 1222 (1984).
58. "[W]e believe that the added assurance of just compensation to the victims of drunken
driving as well as the added deterrent effect of the rule on such driving outweigh the importance of"
the camaradie that is experienced at social gatherings where alcohol is served. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at
1224.
59. Id. at 570, 476 A.2d at 1235-36 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
60.
I do not propose to fashion a legislative solution. That is for the Legislature. I merely wish
to point out that the Legislature has a variety of alternatives to this Court's imposition of
unlimited liability on every New Jersey adult. Perhaps, after investigating all the options, the
Legislature will determine that the most effective course is to impose the same civil liability on
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dissent, however, ignores the limitations inherent in the legislative process.
The legislature may have access to more information enabling it better to
engage in interest balancing, but that information is ordinarily irrelevant to
the specific question that the common law court is required to answer.
The implications of Landes and Posner's causal perspective can be seen
when applied to the social host problem. Landes and Posner believe that tort
liability should be allocated among the contributing factors to the extent that
these factors maximize wealth.6 1 The courts, then, must decide how best to
help society to maximize wealth. Landes and Posner argue that most
causation situations are special cases of the multiple tortfeasor problem. 62 In
trying to allocate liability in the social host situation, the courts must decide
which party or parties could prevent an accident from happening at the least
cost.63 If the social host is in a better position than the guest to appreciate the
danger of futher liquor consumption by the guest, then the social host should
bear the burden of preventing the injury to an innocent third person.
Therefore, the common law ought to permit indemnification of the guest by
the social host for any damages that are allocated to the host. If the guest can
avoid the danger at a lower cost than can the social host, then she ought to
bear the liability alone. In addition, if wealth maximization requires both
parties to be careful, then each should bear some burden by permitting, for
example, the social host to secure contribution from the guest or by holding
the social host liable unless he has provided a breathalizer at the door.
Posner suggested in his early work that the courts' application of
negligence rules was always efficient (by which Posner meant wealth
maximizing). 64 He has now come to the conclusion that this early view was
too narrow. 65 Posner's original position is consistent with the reason for his
change in position in my interpretation of Landes and Posner's theory.
Posner originally thought that negligence was wealth maximizing because he
thought one party or the other generally was in the better position to avoid
social hosts that the majority has imposed today. I would have no qualms about that legislative
decision so long as it was reached after a thorough investigation of its impact on average citizens
of New Jersey.
Id. at 570, 476 A.2d at 1235-36 (Garibaldi,J. dissenting); cf Miller v. Moran, 96 Il. App. 3d 596, 421
N.E.2d 1046 (1981) (decision on further remedies is a legislative decision).
For a similar approach to the use of policy in judicial decision making, see Kelley v. R. G. -Industries,
304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) (holding that a gun manufacturer cannot be held liable for
injuries to innocent third parties under the traditional principles of tort law, but that policy permits
the courts to hold the manufacturers of "saturday night specials" liable in tort).
61. Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517
(1980).
62. Id. at 529 (whenever it was possible to do so, common law courts adopted rules of
contribution and indemnification that maximized wealth).
63. Id. at 533.
64. Compare Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1970) (arguing that negligence is
generally the efficient rule in tort cases) and Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1971) (strict liability is generally an inefficient system of assigning tort liability) with Landes and
Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851 (1982) (both strict liability and
negligence can be wealth maximizing).
65. Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 916-21 (1980).
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accidents. In such a world, rules of negligence and contributory negligence
would allocate accident costs to the party who, in terms of the Learned Hand
formula, could best avoid accident costs and thus maximize wealth. Once
Posner was convinced that this simple view of accidents was inaccurate, he had
to accept the broader multiple tortfeasor perspective. 66 Of course, both the
revised Posner (with Landes) and the original Posner positions are consistent
with viewing the causal inquiry in a purely attributive manner.
Landes and Posner would make the assumption in the social host problem
that the cheapest way of avoiding an accident is to hold the guest liable for her
actions. There are two reasons for making this assumption. First, the
common law would allocate liability this way. Because the common law
approach is wealth maximizing, making this assumption should result in
wealth maximization. Second, by not holding social hosts liable for providing
extra protection, courts put more responsibility on individuals and thus
require less government intervention in the private lives of citizens. Despite
this perspective, the causal inquiry remains an empirical one of allocating
liability among all the parties and the choices they made affecting the way in
which they interacted. For Posner and Landes, all of the potential causal
agents are attributive causes.
By examining the economists' theories, Hart and Honor 's distinction
between attributive and explanatory causes and between causes and
conditions becomes clear. My analysis of their views demonstrates that the
distinction between attributive and explanatory causes is difficult, but not
meaningless. In moving from explanatory to attributive questions, the law
and economics theorists have altered the focus of the debate. Coase and
Calabresi are looking for noncausal answers to attributive questions and,
consequently, they have had to develop an explanatory notion of cause.
Posner and the later law and economics adherents have developed a purely
attributive model of cause. Explanatory questions are not asked because the
causal questions have no explanatory power outside the attributive
framework. The fact that these shifts in focus leave no room for moral
perspectives demonstrates the importance of the distinction between causes
and conditions, and the importance of the interrelationship of the attributive
and explanatory causal inquiries. It is only if the causal decision maker is
capable of and does look at both explanatory and attributive questions that
moral perspectives can be incorporated in the determination of causation, the
assignment of responsibility, and the allocation of liability. Economists have
drained the moral quality from the causal question by attempting to erase the
distinction between attributive and explanatory causes. The result is an
inability to create an effective definition of causation and really to understand
when responsibility should be assigned. There are some gains, however, from
this causal evisceration. Causal decision makers who follow the economic
theorists are able to see potential causal relationships among factors that are
66. Id.
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obscured by Hart and Honor6's traditional causal framework. But these
factors are outside the traditional framework precisely because they involve
claims that are outside the moral framework of the causal inquiry. 67 Cause
exists for the economists only to the extent that they destroy the ability of the
causal decision maker to appreciate causal questions.
67. For example, economists cannot explain how a court might find a parent guilty of child
abuse and neglect and order his children taken from him, but not find the parent guilty of the same
offense in criminal law. The reason for this distinction in treatment is that while the parent's actions
may have caused the injuries to the children, they are often not intentional actions. Landes & Posner
have argued that we could and should eliminate the notion of intention from intentional tort and
collapse tort analysis into an analysis of diminution of social welfare. Landes & Posner, An Economic
Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 127 (1981).
When legal concepts are collapsed into a single standard, there is some gain because courts and
other causal decision makers are able to make their evaluations in a one-step analysis. There is also a
loss, however, in the courts' ability to make individualized comparisons. For example, the parent in
my hypothetical could in fact have contributed to the loss of social welfare by using the wrong
standards to disipline a child and yet not be liable in criminal law (or in tort law to the child) because
the parent's action lacked the requisite wrongful quality. Hart and Honor6's concepts of cause and
condition are helpful in understanding such problems. The parent's actions caused the injury if they
were both abnormal and voluntary. In reading those concepts into the question whether a parent is
guilty of abuse and neglect, the court is asking whether the actions of the parent were, at least,
conditions. In asking whether the parent ought to be punished, the court has to ask the additional
question of whether the parent's actions were wrongful. When the notion of intention is eliminated,
it is not possible to distinguish the second question from the first question.
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